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The Atheism
of Heidegger, Sartre,
and Thomas Aquinas
By THEODORE

J.

KISIEL

"God is dead . . . . We hav e killed him - you and 1. We are all murderers." These
words might well be taken from the liturgy for Good Friday. But they are not. Rather,
they are the often-quoted words of Friedrich Nietzsche, his indictment of a 19th century culture which was Christian in name only. And the same words serve as a
gUiding clue to the immediate issue for tonight, namely, the extent, the significance
and the challenge of atheistic existentialism.
But first of all, underlying this issue is the prior question, "What is existentialism?"
And even at this late date, in answer to this question, some say, "Existentialism is
atheism." Others correctly make a distinction between theistic and atheistic existentialism, but then proceed to discuss the matter as if the distinction were never made.
As a matter of fact, the number of atheists among the leaders of this philosophical
movement is relatively few. If we consider him among the founding fathers, there
is the tortured figure of Friedrich Nietzsche. In our century, the only clear cut cases
of atheism in the strict sense of the word are Jean-Paul Sartre and his close friend,
Simone de Beauvoir. Usually associated with Sartre are Maurice Merleau·Ponty
and Albert Camus, both of whose writings have an atheistic tendency. But it should
be noted that reports on their personal commitments at the time of death point to
the contrary, so that, in the last analysis, we a re not the ones to render final judgment.
On the other side of tlle fence, in the theistic camp, we can clearly classify such
central figures as Soren Kierkegaard , Karl Jaspers, Gabriel Marcel, Martin Buber,
Nikolai Berdyeav, Miguel de Unamuno, Jose Ortega y Gasset, Paul Tillich, and
the most promising of the new generation, Paul Ricouer. Also to be included here
are the outstanding commentators on existentialism, like Alphonse de Waelhens ,
Father Leo van Breda, and Father Albert Dondeyne at the University of Louvain
in Belgium; and, in this country, some of the men at Northwestern and at Duquesne
UniverSity. Finally in our classifying, we come to Martin Heidegger and Thomas
Aquinas, both of whom I shall, for the moment, pass over in silence.
But let 's dispense with any further name dropping, and proceed now into the question, "What is existentialism?" The primitive fact or basic idea of existentialism is
not atheism, but rather, it is the special significance that is attached to the notion of
"existence." If we wish to understand what existentialism is, we must understand
what existence is for existentialism.
First of all, it must be emphatically asserted that" existence" here has nothing to
do with the Scholastic notion of existentia. We cannot read Heidegger and Sartre
Witll Scholastic eyes (or more accurately, with Scholastic blinders) and expect to

Published by eCommons, 1964

19

1

University of Dayton Review, Vol. 1 [1964], No. 2, Art. 4
understand them. This was Maritain 's mistake. I When Heidegger writes that the
essence of human reality is its existence, and Sartre states that existence precedes
essence, they are taking no stand either for or against the so-called real distinction
between exis/entia and essen/ia. Nor does existence simply refer to the brute fact of
being real, as it did for Kant. Rather, existence for existentialism refers to the manner of being which is proper to man, and to man alone. Thus when Kierkegaard
writes, " God does not exist. He is. Only man exists," he is using the term " exist "
in this special sense.
Let 's try to make this special meaning more precise by turning to the founding
father Kierkegaard. It all began in his revolt against Hegel, in the early nineteenth
century. Hegel built an abstract system of thought which claimed to explain everything, but the only thing it didn't explain was the most important, namely, human
existence as we experience it. Kierkegaard compared Hegel to a man who builds an
immense castle, completely furnished, but who then continues to live next door in
the shack, the outhouse that human existence really is. In opposition to Hegel 's vicious abstraction of reason from concrete human existence, Kierkegaard called for
a return to the most fundamental question which every man must face, namely, " What
does it mean for m e to exist? " Thus existence is first of all a personal question. To
exist for man is to question , to inqUire, to search for meaning. Man is first of all
a question to himself. And it is a question that demands an answer or deciSion.
Hence a second meaning: To exist for man is to choose. There is no escape. We
cannot not choose, for not to choose is itself a choice, the choice of the indifferent
and the lukewarm, which, according to the Scriptures, " I vomit from my mouth."
(So as you see, nausea is very Christian; Sartre has no priority over this theme.)
And Kierkegaard was primarily interested in the Christian decision, a decision which
he saw being ignored in his time. As he put it, "Christianity is a radical cure; one
puts it off as long as possible." But only by making this deCision can a man realize
the full meaning of human existence. Thus existence ultimately means the faith relationship of the solitary iJ1dividuai faCing his God. For Kierkegaard then, existence is a
personal question, a personal decision, and a personal relationship to God.
Later existentialists have retained all of these meanings, but have expanded the
notion of existence as relation to the other relationships of man in his world. For
man, to exist is to relate. In its etymology, existence comes from the Latin ex-sis/ere,
to stand out, taken here in the relational sense of standing out toward something;
for Kierkegaard, a standing out toward God; for later existentialists, a standing out
toward the world in all of its modalities, toward other persons, and even and especially a standing out toward oneself.
After Kierkegaard, the next key figure in the development of the contemporary existentialism was Edmund Husserl, the father of phenomenology, who was in his prime
in the early 1900 's. Like Kierkegaard, Husserl called for an abandonment of the
abstractions of the philosophy of his day, and for a return to immediate experience .
.:(u den Sachen selbs/, "Back to the things themselves, " "Back to immediate experi-
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ence," (he said over and over again) and this dictum became the battle cry of intellectual Europe. If we wish to make philosophy into a strict science, he said, we
must start all over again by returning to the world as we live it, the Lebenswelt or
"lived world, " the only true starting point of philosophy. But in order to do this,
we must first clear away a host of false problems in philosophy, artificial constructs
which obstruct our view of the Lebenswelt. This is precisely what is involved in Husser! 's phenomenological method. Its key notion of intentionality is a kin to the notion
of existence as relation, for it asserts that consciousness is always conscious of something which is not itself consciousness. This may sound self evident or even trivial,
but it is precisely this point that had been overlooked by the three centuries of philosophy since Descartes. For Descartes ' Cogito ergo sum had reduced man to an isolated and disembodied thinker, a consciousness closed on itself, knOWing only the
contents of its consciousness , and uncertain about the existence of the world external
to it. And so Descartes introduced God into his system primarily to guarantee the
existence of the external world. And so in the next century, Kant asserted that it is
a scandal of philosophy that no one had as yet proved the existence of the external
world . To wh ich Heidegger recently replied that, on the contrary, the scandal of
philosophy is not the lack of such a proof, but rather the scandal of philosophy is
that such a proof was ever attempted in the first place. For our immediate experience
not only contains the certainty of our own existence, as Descartes found in his Cogito
ergo sum, but also the certainty of the existence of a world with which we are immediately involved. Thus Husser! 's phenomenological method is designed, first of all ,
to clear away the pseudo-problems of philosophy , and second, to capture the movements of man toward his worlds, and to describe our human experience as it is actually lived . Only then can we hope to at least begin to ask the right questions in
philosophy. And Husserl 's method was nothing less than explosive, for it led to a
vast and systematic program to re-examine the immediate evidences of man in his
involvements in the world. For first a philosopher must describe how man exists his
worlds, and only then can he develop his unified field theory of experience.
The next key figure we must consider is Martin Heidegger, the greatest of the existentialist philosophers. In ambition a nd achievement, Heidegger is a philosopher
of the grand style, comparable to such metaphysical greats as Parmenides and Plato,
Aristotle and Aquinas , Kant and Hegel. In 1927, Heidegger published his first and
major work , Being and Tim e, destined to become the mag nus opus of 20th century
philosoph y . Heidegger in effect merged Kierkegaard 's existentialism and Husser! 's
phenomenology and gave us existential phenomenology. But Heidegger went even
further and placed the intentional or existential relationship on the level of first philosophy, the philosophy of Being. For existence in Heidegger is not only to-be-inthe-world, but, more basically, it is man's open relation to Being. For Heidegger,
Being is man's most original experience, the background of all other experiences,
the amaZing experience of I AM, an experience which each man spends his entire
life trying to comprehend. It is the experience of a fundamental coincidence between
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man and Being, or at first, between man and his world , Le., the traditional theme
of man as microcosm. It is a theme that was first struck at the dawn of Western
civilization in the words of Parmenides:

,
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For the same it is to think and to be, or,
Thinking and Being are the same.
In other words, man and the universe belong together; they are in fact one. And in
his highest activity, man is Being and Being is man . Rank subjectivism, you say.
Then S1. Thomas was a subjectivist too, for he often quoted Aristotle to the effect
that anima humana est quodammodo omnia. The secret lies in the meaning of " in
a certain way" (to auto) or "the same." What we have here is the classical philosophical problem of identity and difference, and to rethink this problem in terms
of human existence is precisely the task that Heidegger has set for himself. Thus,
the existential ontology of Heidegger, which is a rethinking of an old theme in a
new and radical way, is one major reason why existentialism is the 20th century
fulfillment of the philosophia perennis.
Within the comprehensive notions of existence that Heidegger has given to us,
existence as being-in-the-world and openness to Being, we can distinguish four more
concrete dimensions: prepersonal existence, or man's relation to the world through
his body; impersonal existence, or man 's relationship to the things in the world;
personal existence, or man 's relationship to himself; and interpersonal existence, or
man's relationship to other people. It should be noted that these are not clear and
distinct distinctions, for in fact each of these dimensions dovetail and involute into
each other within the comprehensiveness of Being. Let's now briefly consider each of
these dimensions.
First of all, existence is prepersonal existence, which is the incarnation of my existence, standing out into the world through my body. The basic question here is,
"How do I exist My body?," a question that has been confronted systematically
for the first time by the 20th century philosophers of incarnation, Marcel, Sartre,
and especially Merleau-Ponty. What we are dealing with here is the body as each
one of us lives it, the subjective body, and not the objective body that one finds, for
example, on the technicolor pages of phYSiology books, which is not my body, the
body as I live it, but any human body. For the body viewed SCientifically is the
body viewed externally and impersonally by others, and ultimately the body viewed
as a cadaver, a corpse, or at most, a hydraulic robot.
My body: what is the meaning of this possessive mine? To possess is to have for
oneself. Do I have my body in the way I have a car, or in the way 1 have a cigar,
or in the way 1 have a basketball? Or isn't it a bit more intimate than that? For my
body is me. We don't hesitate to refer to ourselves when it 's really a matter of our
bodies, in statements such as, "I wash myself" or "I weigh myself" or "I see my-
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self in the mirror " or "I'm eating an apple" or " I'm smoking a cigarette." And
when a friend appears, we say , " There he is" and not "There 's his body." In other
words, we are our bodies, I am my body. And yet this seems too strong, and could
be the assertion of a crude materialist. I am my body or I have my body: which is it?
Marcel points out that both statements are partially true and therefore both are false.
The answer lies somewhere in between. I both am and have my body, my body is
both me and not me, I and It, ego and id, person and thing. Thus we encounter
the profound mystery of our incarnation in the ambiguity of the human body, an
ambiguity which finds its counterpart in St. Thomas' ambiguous conception of the
human soul, as both in and out of the body , as both form of the body and independent spirit.
Second, existence is impersonal existence, man's concern with the things in the
world, the I-it relation. This includes the daily world of practical concerns, the tool
world of technology, and the scientific world of impersonal objectivity toward nature.
In short, it is the world of homo faber (man the worker), in which man realizes himself through work, where man humanizes himself by humanizing the universe. But
impersonal existence also raises the possibility of dehumanization, where man becomes the victim of the I-it relation, and is himself reduced to an impersonal function ,
or even a thing; for exam pie, the levelled society portrayed in George Orwell's 1984,
in which men are reduced to uniformed robots: or even worse, the exaggerated scientistic view of man as nothing but a combination of chemicals, a point of view
that is appropriate only to someone who plans to use other men as fertilizer. Also
on this level of impersonal existence belongs the impersonal observer of science, in
which, true, Enrico Fermi, or Michelson and Morely perform the experiment, but
anyone else can perform the same experiment and get the same results. Also the
impersonal " one" of the craftsman, or the engineer who tests fuel elements for nuclear
reactors, where, true, I'm doing the job, but it doesn 't really matter who does the
Job, as long as it's done. The it has priority here, whereas the man is replacable,
and even expendable, like cannon fodder for the front lines. We are here in the world
of the replacable you.
The situation is preCisely the opposite on the third level of personal existence, the
world of the unique and irreplacable 1. For there are certain things which only [
can do, which no one can do for me, which I cannot pass off to someone else. I
refer now to the basic questions of existence, which no one can decide for me, which
I must ultimately decide for myself, alone.
Here we touch on one of the best known existentialist themes, man as situated
freedom, called upon to come to terms with the meaning of existence, espeCially in
his moments of crisis . These are the moments in which the secure routine of the impersonal daily world suddenly breaks wide open in shipwreck; the moments in which
the boredom of living turn into the drama of Being, when the Being in which man
is intrinsically involved is radically thrown into question, when man becomes a question to himself, when he must face the basic realities of human existence. But it is at
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once an opportunity for self-discovery and the comprehension of reality as it really
is. J n Bergman 's movie, Through a Glass Darkly, reflecting on his experience of
crisis, the boy exclaims: " Reality burst, and I tumbled out. " Here we have existence
in all the intensity that Kierkegaard saw in it, existence as personal question, personal decision, and ultimately personal relationship to the Transcendent Being. It is
a movement which is always present, though usually subdued by the tasks of impersonal existence, for man is always in dialogue with himself, always an unfinished
reality, a homo viato/; who must renew or even change his fundamental commitments up to the moment of his death. And only he himself can decide on existence,
so man, in his personal existence is alone.
But are we ever absolutely alone? No, because existence is at once interpersonal
existence. But the nature of this co-existence has been a problem ever since Descartes
isolated his own thinking ego , and then wondered whether the creatures in overcoats,
that he saw moving in the streets were, like himself, also thinking egos, or whether
they might not simply be automatons. Hence the problem in philosophy of the existence of the other as other, the problem of the alter ego. This problem led to that
strange philosophical animal known as the solipsist, who asserts that he 's the only
one who exists, that everyone else is a figment of his imagination, and then proceeds
to write books to tell these imaginary everyones that he's the only one who exists!
Other philosophers state that we know others as conscious like ourselves by a kind
of reasoning by analogy , in which I know that your inside is the same as my inside,
by seeing that your outside behaves like my outside, in anger, shame, grief, and the
like. But this overlooks the fact that one of the terms of the analogy is generally
unknown, namely, my own outside, except in special cases like the mirror. But if
you insist on reasoning by analogy, then you must explain to me how an infant
responds to the meaning of his mother 's smile at the age of 10 days, knows the
signs of anger at 2 months, long before he sees his own face. So it is not by analogy
that we grasp the sense of the other 's glance and gesture, his grief and his anger,
his scream of pain and his shudder of fear, but in a much more immediate and
mysterious way. Thus lVIerleau-Ponty points to a primordial communion of bodies,
which he calls intercorporality, in which we are, from the very beginning of our
existence, in tune with each other through the secrets of our bodies, ties of flesh and
blood deeper than we 've ever suspected. This corporal co-existence is the immediate
basis for all further co-existence.
And if existence is always co-existence or being-with-others, then we can never be
absolutely alone, even when we are alone, let us say, in our rooms. For the room
is filled with furnishings made by others: and in that room I engage myself in reading
books written by others, preparing lectures for others, writing letters to another,
dreaming about others, thinking about others, and even when I think about more
abstract things, like act and potency, I think in a language developed by centuries
of others. Even more fundamentally, I am lonely or alone only because of the other,
her absence. And if we should assume that existence were not at once co-existence,
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then we would be lonely without knowing that we were lonely. There is no escape.
If we experience loneliness, and we do , then we can only do so on the basis of a
more immediate experience of the other.
Hence, existence is at once a being-with-others, a co-existence, though it is not a
co-existence which is always peaceful. For relations between man and man can range
from the person-destroying I-it relation of hate, to the I-he of indifference, the I-you
of justice, or regard for the dignity of others, and finally, the intimate I-thou of love.
It is on this latter level that we mllst also ultimately locate the relationship between
God and man.
But if we now turn to a discussion of Sartre's atheism,2 we find that he invariably
reduces the relation between God and man to the impersonal I-it relation. But first,
a general statement on Sartre's atheism. Underlying all of his "ways" to the nonexistence of God is only one fundamental argument, namely, the assertion that if man
is free, God does not exist. And Sartre endows man with a freedom so absolute that
he finds the idea of God 's existence absolutely intolerable.
Sartre bases one of his "ways" on his solution to the problem of the alter ego. In
his view, we discover the other as subjectivity in the other's hateful stare, the regard
which destroys my own subjectivity and reduces me to an "it," an object, a thing.
In his analysis of the hateful stare, Sartre begins with the example of a man who is
spying through a keyhole. While in this role, let's say that I suddenly hear footsteps
behind me and now find myself the object of the disdainful gaze of another, who is
now my judge. Dominated by the other's stare, I find myself a slave dependent on a
freedom which is not mine. I am no longer master of the situation, for I am now an
object in the world of another, who controls my immediate destiny. Thus I am reduced from subject to object, and at the same time, in the other's dominating gaze,
I discover him as subjectivity and freedom in control of the situation. It is the look
that kills, the regard that murders my subjectivity.
What to do in a situation like this? There are only two alternatives: either su bmit
to being an object of another's stare, or rise up in revolt, and with a tremendous effort, reduce the other's subjectivity to being an object of my stare. And this, for the
Sartre of 1943, is the essence of human relations, Le., a state of war between man and
man. It is a picture of the world reminiscent of the rugged individualism of Thomas
Hobbes, for whom (homo homini lupus) "man is a wolf to man." Also the world of the
master-at-arms in Billy Budd, who looked into the ocean and saw" a world of gliding
monsters preying on their fellows." And for that matter, it is the world of the 20th
century, the century that created the concentration camp and gave us at least two
world wars. The analysis of the keyhole situation, at first Sight trivial, had profound
overtones for its first audience of 1943, a year in which men faced each other through
gunsights at the front lines, stood terrified before firing squads, and were being reduced to fertilizer in the gas ovens of Dachau, Auschwitz, Buchenwald, and Belsen.
And 1963 is not much different, when two collective subjectivities watch each other
in uneasy "co-existence," and play a game called international relations while a
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Damocles sword of an H-bomb hangs overhead . And we still find the hateful stare
on the faces of a frenzied crowd before a Southern school; or variations of it in the
scornful glances at a migrant worker; or (in our over-competitive society) the suspicious looks of those involved in the dog-eat-dog game called " playing politics; "
and the lecherous leer, so powerfully portrayed in Bergman 's movie Th e Virgin
Spring, is always with us.
So Sartre's phenomenology of the hateful stare is not without ground. In fact, it
is a continuation of a tradition of criticism of a nominally Christian culture that
stems from 19th century philosophers like Kierkegaard , Nietzsche, and Marx, a
criticism which is still valid today. For we still live in a world in which murder and
manslaughter are institutionalized, in an unbalanced economic order in which 80%
of the wealth is in the hands of only 17% of the population, and in which two-thirds
of the world go to bed hungry . And for this we are all gUilty.
But you object and say to me: " We didn 't make this world. That 's the way we
found it. " And then we turn back to our lives and continue to enjoy the benefits of
this world of exploitation. But is it possible to have a clean conscience in a world
which for most people is a concentration camp? And not to act is itself an act, an
act which makes us accomplices by omission. There is no escape. We are involved
in a dirty world from which we cannot withdraw our hands. "Man's hands are always dirty" says Sartre in one of his plays. It is preCisely here that we find the
immediate significance and challenge of contemporary atheism, whether it stems from
Sartre or from Marx. It is the challenge to change an inhuman world into a human
world. And if we are not willing to accept this challenge, then our Christianity is a
lie. We can no longer be satisfied with the escape hatch of a Platonic Christianity,
a vertical Christianity. If to be a man is to-be-in-the-world, as the existentialists assert, then to be a Christian is to be a Christian-in-the-world. To baptize some words
from Marx, Man Christianizes himself by Christianizing the universe. No one can
truly say " 1 am a Christian " unless he lives in a world whose institutions are the
embodiment of charity, and not in the world of hate that Sartre describes.
On the basis of his solution to the problem of the other in the hateful stare, Sartre
proceeds to devise a "way" to the non-existence of God. In this world in which we
co-exist in conflict and hate, other people are always and everywhere present, and
so I am always potentially in the state of being seen by the others. The same applies to my co-starers in the world. But we cannot go on to infinity in the series of
starers who are being stared at, and thus we arrive at the Un stared-at Starer, and
this Sartre calls "God." In other words, "Big Brother is watching you." What we
have here is a parody of 1984, where Big Brother keeps his people under constant
surveillance by a system of TV sets which at once make him inaccessible to our
return gaze. For no one has even seen Big Brother. Thus Sartre gives us a dictator
of the world, a supreme despot who whips his vassals to a frenzy in periodic sessions
of "five minutes of hate." But this supreme despot is a god that Sartre cannot accept,
because his omnipresent gaze over his universe takes freedom away from man and
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reduces him to a thing among other things. And so Sartre compares the God-man
rel ationship to the person-destroying I-it relation which reduces man to a thing.
In another approach, Sartre likens God to a superior cra&sman who manufactures
paper knives according to a pre-determined idea. In the same way, Sartre says, God
created man according to a pre-determined idea in His mind. This implies that man
is in the same way that a paper knife is, which reduces man to a thing that is predetermined and finished, once it has been manufactured. But if this is so, then man
is not free, and this Sartre cannot accept. Reducing the foregoing to a crude syllogism, we have the following: If God is a superior cra&sman , then man is a paper
knife. But, insists Sartre, man is not a paper knife. Therefore, God does not exist.
But the conclusion goes too far. It should rather be: God is not a superior cra&sman. And to this we agree. For if we think of God in analogy to a manufacturer of
paper knives, there is no escape: man 's freedom is taken away. When the relation
between God and man is conceived as an impersonal I-it relation, man is reduced
from the free person that he is to a pre-determined thing.
What Sartre has rejected here is in effect the counterfeit god of deterministic mechanism, which equates the divine causality with physical causality. At its worst, it is
the causality of the billiard ball, in which one thing pushes another thing into motion. Thus God as First Cause becomes the Supreme Pusher, and certainly no one
willingly falls to his knees before a Big Push. With regard to such gods, we join
Sartre in being uncompromising atheists.
And it is precisely this kind of atheism that we also find in Heidegger. Heidegger
takes issue with the entire history of metaphysics for giving us, not only a host of
false problems, but along with them, a host of false gods . With regard to the rationalistic conception of God as Ens Causa SUi, (the being who causes himself) Heidegger
says:
Confronted by the Causa su~ man may neither fall to his knees in reverence,
nor may he sing and dance. To this god, man may neither pray, nor may
he offer sacrifices.
But perhaps this god-less thinking, which must give up god as Causa sui,
the god of philosophy, is closer to the divine God. 3
These are certainly not the words of an atheist, at least in the strict sense of the
word. Or if you will, Heidegger is as much an atheist as St. Thomas, who once
turned on David of Dinant in anger, calling him the Latin equivalent of a raving
idiot for his brand of theism, which equated God with prime matter. In other words ,
what we have here is not absolute atheism, but a relative atheism , an atheism which
is the necessary counterpart to any authentic theism. Such a relative atheism has
had a long tradition in philosophy. The very first Christian philosopher, St. Justin
the Martyr, living in the shadow of the Roman god Jupiter, answered certain charges
of the Roman authorities by saying: "We are called atheists . And yes, we confess it,
we are atheists of those so-called gods." And it was for this atheism that Socrates
was condemned to death . In the same vein, Maritain, in speaking of the god of the
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idolaters, says: "With regard to this god, the saint is ... the most atheistic of
men." 4 What we have here is the atheism which the first of the Ten Commandments
demands of every man. For the affirmation of the Divine God always involves the
violent negation of all counterfeit gods. It is precisely this kind of atheistic movement
that underlies much of contemporary philosophy. Thus, philosophy today must spend
much of its time in attacking false notions of God, in the smashing of idols. To adapt
Nietzsche's words, we must learn to philosophize with a sledge hammer. For philosophy today must use the negative way even more extensively than St. Thomas, who
lived in an age of faith, and not in the age of the absence of God, the 20th century.
This is one of the reasons for the themes of negativity and nothingness in Heidegger 's
philosophy, but it is a negativity which hides a great concern for a more authentic
notion of God.
So we must be a little more discriminate in our charges of atheism and negativism.
And we must also be a little more discrete in criticizing the existentialist concern for
the notion of Nothingness. I think it 's high time that we dispensed with the cute joke
which puns about how Sartre has written a book of 700 pages . .. about Nothing!
As if these men were so stupid as to be spending so much time writing about" absolute nothingness " a concept which is basically unthinkable. To decry the theme of
Notllingness in philosophy is to forget one of the first lessons of metaphysics, the
lesson of Parmenides. From Parmenides, we learn that the total abolition of N othingness results in the abolition of novelty and diversity from the universe. Thus Plato
re-introduced the theme of relative non-being into philosophy, and his pupil Aristotle
gave us the baffling pure potency of prime matter, which has been described as " a
nothing which is and a something which isn't. " Second, the rejection of Nothingness
also forgets the fundamental reality of the NO in human existence. For the NO is
not simply a logical reality, as the Scholastics would have it, but a reality which
we experience in a multitude of ways in our lives, from the trivial "NO smoking"
or "NO parking, " to the profound NO of a profound refusal or a fundamental rejection, or the NO of the absence of a loved one. Then there is the basic NO that
comes from our being finite, which Heidegger describes as throwness. For we are
thrown into a world we didn 't make and into a life we didn 't ask for. But is man
thrown into the world like garbage is thrown into a can, as Sartre would have it?
"NO," we cry, "by God, NO." And thus we have the NO of hope, which refuses
absurdity and despair. So there is much ado about Nothing in contemporary philosophy, but not all of it is pure niliilism, like the NO to false gods spoken by men
in search of the one true God.
But can philosophy hope to bring men closer to the divine God, as for example,
by means of the traditional Five Ways? In a talk here last month, Frank Sheed
struck a standard existentialist theme when he indicated that, in his forty years of
street preaching, he had not converted a Single person by means of the Five Ways.
And Marcel refers to the proofs as " irrefutable but unconvincing." As Heidegger
puts it, no one sinks to his knees before the First Cause. To talk of God only as
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First Cause is like my trying to describe the reality of "my mother" only in terms
of a few phySiological processes. This is not to deny the relative value of the Five
Ways. For just as it may happen that sometimes only physiology can determine
who my real mother is, and who the false mothers are, so metaphysics helps to
determine in its way who God is and which gods are false gods. For sometimes even
the believer can be mistaken about God, and prays instead to a glorified Santa Claus,
or a super-physician, a super-psychiatrist, a super-matchmaker, or even a superScholastic. For such people, a little genuine metaphysics would do no harm.
But philosophy is hardly finished when it has acknowledged God as First Cause.
This is particularly true today, when the notion of cause has been depleted of its full
import. For centuries now, causality has been interpreted too much in terms of the
impersonal causality of tlle physical universe, a world in which determinism rules.
Sartre is right here. For to interpret the Divine causality only in the impersonal terms
of determinism certainly leaves no room for human freedom. What philosophy today
needs is a much more personal category of causality, a category in which the divine
creativity and human freedom can be reconciled . In other words, the causal relation
between God and man must be conceived more in terms of a relation between persons.
To locate such an interpersonal category of causality, why not begin with our own
interpersonal existence? We can find such a category in the highest possible realization between human beings, namely, the I-thou relation of love. For a cause is customarily defined as anything that exercises a positive influence on the being or becoming of a being. And what could be more positive in its influence than love? For
authentic love, far from destroying the other 's freedom and subjectivity, is creative
in its personal regard. The lover grants the creative fiat to the beloved, in effect saying, "Be as you are, become what you are. " Does a mother's love stifle a child's
subjectivity and freedom? On the contrary, it is precisely when this creative element
is missing that a stifling of freedom may occur. Witness the outstanding cases of
infant schizophrenia. Anyone who is not loved develops into a very weak subject
incapable of exercising his freedom, for whom the world is always an obstacle inspiring hatred. Without love the world is hell for man. As St. Augustine put it centuries ago, "Nothing is lovable to man without the love of his fellow man ." 5 This
implies that even the love of God is known only through human love. It is here that
the philosopher can find a starting point suitable for re-thinking the category of
divine causality. For here we have a manifestation of a causality between persons
which has full regard for the freedom and dignity of the other. And we could begin
with philosophers like Marcel and Buber, who have given us valuable insights into
the elusive subject of human love. Furthermore a re-interpretation of causality in
terms of love is perfectly in tune with some relatively undeveloped points in Thomistic
metaphysics, which extols a God whose principal attribute is not power, but goodness,
whose causality is not so much a force being exercised, but an infinite goodness being
communicated.
But why stop here? What is needed is a complete revamping of traditional philos-
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ophy in terms of a personalist perspective, which Father de Finance calls" one of
the most urgent tasks which confronts Thomism today." 6 After what Sartre and his
contemporaries have shown us, we can no longer be satisfied with an impersonal
metaphysics. For too long has philosophy been burdened by the thing categories
stemming from Aristotle, whereby not only man but even at times God was reduced
to a thing. The greatness of St. Thomas is particularly apparent in what he managed
to do even with the thing-philosophy of Aristotle.
But since we now have newer and more powerful categories, why do we so slavishly
insist on the sterile categories of the past? Why the appeal to something called" paleoThomism of the Strict Observance?" As far as I'm concerned, this is usually only a
front for the twentieth-century version of decadent Scholasticism. As if one philosophy
of one century has all of the answers and can solve all of our problems. And I'm
not interested in such games as what St. Thomas would have said if he were confronted with our problems. The fact remains that he is not. This is our century, and
these are our problems, and it is we who must answer.
The powerful philosophical framework of St. Thomas will no doubt playa large
part for us, but at the same time, we cannot afford to ignore the profound insights
of seven additional centuries of philosophy. I refer especially to the gradual unfolding
of the meaning of human subjectivity from Descartes to Sartre. For I agree with
Sartre when he says that existence precedes essence, which, translated into the idiom
of the noun, says that person precedes thing. But Heidegger promises more, for he
has penetrated beyond these nouns to their unity in the secret energy of the verb,
to be. To my mind, such a depth of penetration has been realized only once before
in the history of philosophy, in the 13th century. There is much to be gained by a
dialogue between the two greatest philosophers of the verb, Heidegger and St. Thomas.
In fact, if Thomism wishes to be a living contemporary philosophy, capable of
supplying an answer to the problems of our time, it must take up such a dialogue
with existential phenomenology. For here we have a philosophy which not only expresses the contemporary mood, but also one that invites us to give new thought to
old problems, to express old truths in a new and fresh language, and to discover
new truths never before seen by man, not even by St. Thomas. Isn 't this what Leo
the XIII meant when he said: vetera navis augere, "enrich the old through the new."?
It is a task which calls for dialogue, with all the give and take that this means. I
mean real dialogue, and not the approach of the Scholastic manual, which sets up
straw men of everyone except Aristotle and Aquinas, and then proceeds to mow them
down like badmen in a Western movie. Such an approach can hardly be called
dialogue.
And so we casually dismiss a philosophy which holds the promise of bringing
philosophy closer to the burning issues of human existence, something that the scholastic manual sorely needs. For the typical textbook now in use in Catholic universities reduces philosophy to a verbal game with stock formulas, a game which only
serves to convince the student of the sterility of philosophy. Instead of presenting
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philosophy as an adventure of the human spirit, instead of raising the basic issues
of existence, instead of opening up the world in all of its excitement and anguish,
grandeur and misery, we offer our students a few exercises in logic-chopping, which
they commit to memory for a short time and then forget as qUickly as possible. And
so philosophy in Catholic schools has become notorious for its dull and sterile courses
which are the butt of standard jokes even on our own campuses. And so our students
graduate without ever being exposed to the vital issues which are afoot in human
existence, and especially in the world today. Such an approach can hardly be called
education for life. In fact, it might be exactly the opposite. As Fr. Royce warns us,
"We cannot afford to educate students for life in a hypothetical English-speaking
13th century."
Tonight we have not been dealing with trivial issues. Neither is this one a trivial
issue. I refer now to our terrifying responsibilities as educators in a crucial twentieth
century.
NOTES:
1 Especially in his irrational attacks on Heidegger in Existence and the Existcnt. (Garden City, N.Y.: Image·
Doubleday, 1956), p. 16.
2 Besides the original texts of Sartre, enlightening summaries can be found in commentaries such as:
Wm. Luijpen, O.S.A., Existential Phenomenology (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1960), pp. 313·330.
F. Temple Kingston, French Existentialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), pp . 132-148.
3 Martin Heidegger, JdentiLaet und Differen;;: (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), pp. 70-7l.
4 Jacques Maritain, Th e Range of Reason (New York: Scribner's, 1942), p. 110.
5 Nil homini amicum sine homine amico. Letter to Proba, P.L..33,495.
6 Joseph de Finance, S.]., " Being and Subjectivity," Cross Currents, Vol. VI , Spring 1956, p. 177.
7 James E. Royce, S.J., Man and His Nature (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), p. vi.
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IN A RECENT SEMINAR Theodore Schultz, a distingUished member of the University of Chicago faculty, appraised the prospective obsolescence of various types of
educational attainments. In order of decreasing obsolescence
and increasing durability he listed: (1) vocational and job
skills; (2) knowledge of principles and theories; (3) ability
to solve problems and develop analytical tools; (4) ability
to keep on learning. Fleeting facts memorized for examination , debate, or other special occasion he did not even bother
to list.
Let me emphasize these pOints. Specialized vocational skills
are likely to be made obsolete by advances in science and
technology. The subject matter of science will be more per·
manent, but it, too, will undergo correction and modification
as well as enormous expansion. Problem-solving ability and
the ability to continue one's education will be least subject
to obsolescence a nd most likely to be useful throughout
life. - Theodore o. Yntema. Excerpt from a convocation
address entitled, "Education - Some Neglected Opportunities " delivered at the University of Chicago, March 20, 1964.
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